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MAYBE IT SHOULD JUST BE CALLED
FEDERAL FRAUD: THE CHANGING
NATURE OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTEt
PETER" HENNING *
Congress has engaged in its biannual, election year exercise of
passing an anti-crime statute' that addresses a broad array of criminal
acts that purportedly require prosecution by the Federal Government,
rather than being left to state and local authorities, and increases
punishment for offenders.' Although the additions or alterations di-
rected toward economic crimes are often subsumed in politically-charged
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"Elvis" Candelmo, and Professors Joseph Grano and John Dolan for (heir valuable assistance.
See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976;
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub, L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat.
4789; Violent Crime Control and Law EnfOrcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 Stal.
1796. Congress broke its string of passing election-year crime bills in 1992, when a filibuster by
Republican senators over gun-control measures prevented a final vote on the legislation before
Congress adjourned. See Adalit Clymer, The 1992 Campaign: Congressional Roundup; Key Demo-
cratic Bills Killed in Senate, N.Y. TmEs, Oct. 3, 1992, at A10 (anti-crime measure with "modest
gun-control elements" blocked due to insufficient votes to pass cloture motion).
2 See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976
(instating Sentencing Commission and bail reform); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, §§ 1366-1402, 100 Slat 3207, 3207-35 to 3207-40 (10 year mandatory minimum sentences
for certain drug offenses); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7501-7526, 102
Sett. 4181, 4485 (child pornography and obscenity provisions); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-647, title 11, 104 Stat. 4789, 4792 (child abuse provisions).
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anti-drug or violent crime efforts, these legislative exercises often yield
major changes in the scope and application of provisions utilized by
prosecutors in combatting white collar crimes The latest example of
Congress's proclivity to change an important white collar crime provi-
sion as part of a broader anti-crime effort is found in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("Violent Crime Act"). 4 In
addition to increasing dramatically the number of federal crimes for
which the death penalty can be imposed5 and financing a number of
new crime prevention programs,6 the Violent Crime Act contains an
unheralded change in the mail fraud statute' that will substantially
expand the scope of federal anti-fraud prosecutions.
3 See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1108, 98 Stat.
1837, 2147 (bank fraud statute); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub, L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a),
102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (overturning Supreme Court interpretation of scope of mail fraud statute
in McNally v. United States); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2506, 104 Stat.
4789, 4862 (money laundering). The exception to the election year crime bills is the Financial
Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No, 101-73, 103 Stat. 183,
which Congress passed to combat burgeoning problems related to the near-collapse of the savings
and loan industry.
4 Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 Stat. 1796.
Id. tide VI, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959 (death penalty). The law permits the imposition of the
death penalty for, among other crimes, civil rights murders, child molestation murders, and
murder using a weapon of mass destruction.
6 Id. title III, 108 Stat. 1796, 1836 (crime prevention).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Stipp. 1993). Prior to the 1994 amendment, the statute provided
that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or inti-
mated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office
or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter
or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial
institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.
Id.. Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994:
Section 1341 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by inserting "or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier," after "Postal
Service,"; and
(2) by inserting "or such carrier" after "causes to be delivered by mail". [sic].
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087.
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The mail fraud statute prohibits fraudulent schemes, and the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government has traditionally been prem-
ised on the use of the postal service in executing the scheme. 8 The
statute's original purpose was to protect the mails from being used to
perpetrate frauds, and that function is maintained through the re-
quirement that the illicit mailing be for the "purpose".of executing the
fraudulent scheme.' Over time, the mail fraud statute came to be
viewed as a stop-gap provision that provides a "first line of defense" to
combat innovative frauds until Congress could enact more specific
legislation.'"
That view has now changed, however, as Congress no longer uses
the statute for its original purposes. Instead, the mail fraud statute has
become the primary provision to extend federal jurisdiction to crimes
traditionally prosecuted only at the state and local level. This use of
the mail fraud statute raises a substantial question as to whether that
expansion is the best use of federal resources in an era of shrinking
budgets."
The appeal of the mail fraud statute is its malleability: federal prose-
cutors can pursue investigations with the knowledge that, in bringing
an indictment, they will not be hampered by technical jurisdictional
restrictions often found in other federal criminal statutes.' 2 Moreover,
mail fraud is a predicate act for money laundering's and RICO," which
permits prosecutors, as well as civil litigants under RICO, to use those
' See United States v. Flannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 893 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing mail fraud
conviction for failure to introduce circumstantial evidence to show that use of U.S. mails was
company's routine practice); Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 Duq. L. Rrv.
771, 783 (1980) (original mail fraud statute can reasonably be read as designed to protect against
misuse of the mails), See infra text accompanying notes 25-49 for a discussion of the history of
the mail fraud statute.
9 Sre infra text accompanying notes 25-35 (reviewing early history of the mail fraud statute).
10 United Suites v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
II See infra text accompanying notes 152-54 (discussing federalism problems with extending
the mail fraud statute).
12 Other broad federal criminal law provisions require proof of specific activities as ;!11
element of the offense, in addition to proof of the underlying harm. For example, the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988 & Supp. 1993), requires evidence of interstate activity to promote
gambling, extortion, or bribery; the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988), requires proof .f
extortion by a threat of violence or under color of official right that obstructs interstate com-
merce. See Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute—A Legislative Approach, 20
AM, CRIM. L. Rev. 423, 432 (1983) (arguing that broad mail fraud statute permits prosecutors
and investigators to "enmesh themselves in lengthy, complex investigations with hardly a thought
as to what statute may ultimately be used to indict") (feotnote omitted).
' 3 18 U.S.C, §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
14 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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powerful statutes against individuals and businesses that fall within the
mail fraud statute's applicability to a wide variety of business conduct.
The broad reach of the mail fraud statute, and its companion, the
wire fraud statute,' 5 has been attributed to the willingness of courts to
impose few restrictions on the application of the "scheme and artifice
to defraud" element of the crime.' 6 Over the past two decades, as
federal prosecutors devoted increased attention to white collar crime,"
use of the mail fraud statute shifted away from its traditional applica-
tion of protecting against misuse of the mails, and even as a stop-gap
provision. The statute became a strategic tool in fighting political
corruption and increasingly sophisticated economic misconduct that
in some way employed the postal service, almost regardless of the
mailing's relationship to the underlying scheme.'s The Supreme Court,
in McNally v. United States, 19 tried to prohibit use of the statute in
*18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988 & Stipp. 1993) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall he fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Courts apply the same analysis to schemes charged under the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes.
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) ('The mail and wire fraud statutes share
the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis.").
16 See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM L. REV. 117,126
("courts have refused to define 'scheme to defraud' in terms of any objectively verifiable set of
facts or circumstances"); Hurson, su/ira note 12, at 425 (courts "repeatedly have declined to
articulate any bright line boundaries of the concept of fraud").
17 See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime:
Mow Far Will the Gnats Allow Prosecutors to Co? 54 U. Prrr. L. REY. 405, 408 (1993) ("Beginning
in the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate and foreign government bribery scandals,
the federal government began targeting white collar crime as a high-priority prosecutorial area.").
113 Courts developed the "intangible rights" doctrine to prosecute both private parties and
public officials whose acts involved a breach of fiduciary duty that deprived either the public, an
employer, or others owed a fiduciary duty, of the intangible right to honest and faithful services,
See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir.) (scheme to deprive citizens of
right to fair election through casting of "false, fictitious, or spurious ballots"), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1085 (1984); United Slates v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming conviction
of lawyer who breached duty to client of law firm by advising competing company in a matter
that involved a conflict of interest), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). See generally Project, Ninth
Survey of White Collar Crime
—
Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 703, 708-11 (1994)
thereinafter White Collar Crime Survey] (thoroughly reviewing intangible rights doctrine). See
infra text accompanying notes 127-54 for a discussion of the intangible rights doctrine.
19 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). The Court held that the mail fraud statute only protects property
rights. The case involved a state official's participation in an insurance kickback scheme.
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prosecution of crimes involving non-property rights, such as the right
to honest service by public officials, which had long been subject to
state and local prosecution. Congress reacted quickly to McNally, how-
ever, by passing legislation reinstating the "right of honest services" as
a basis for a conviction under the mail fraud statute.°
The use of the mails has been a substantive limitation on the scope
of the mail fraud statute because the mailing must be "for the purpose
of executing such scheme," and therefore not every mailing tangen-
tially related to the fraud will be sufficient for federal criminal liability. 2 '
Congress, however, enlarged the jurisdictional scope of the mail fraud
statute in the Violent Crime Act by extending its reach, through an
amendment, to any parcel that is "sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier."22
 The statute no longer covers just use
of the postal service to execute a fraudulent scheme, and instead
brings a broader array of methods of delivery into the reach of federal
criminal authorities. By expanding the statute, Congress has again
enhanced what is rapidly becoming the primary weapon for federal
prosecutors to combat white collar crime. 23
Congress's decision to overturn McNally's restrictive interpreta-
tion of the scope of the provision signaled its view of the mail fraud
statute as more than merely a stop-gap that would suffice until it could
adopt more specific legislation to deal with a particular form of crimi-
nal activity. The expansion of the statute's applicability in the Violent
Crime Act represents a further effort to change the nature of the mail
fraud provision into the primary federal law enforcement tool to com-
bat economic crimes. The most recent legislation demonstrates that
Congress has expanded the statute beyond the traditional view of a
provision designed to protect the postal service and, coincidentally, as
a fall-back provision for federal prosecutors, to the paradigm for fed-
eral prosecution of white collar critne. 24
2° 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). Congress enacted the provision as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508.
21 See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); United States v. Haynes, 620 F. Stipp. 474
(M.D. Tenn. 1985).
22 Violent. Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 250006,
108 Stat.. 1796, 2087.
23 See Hurson, supra note 12, at 423 (mail fraud statute has emerged as the "premier weapon"
in the battle against white collar crime). Mr. Hurson, along with Professor Coffee, advocated
cutting back on the scope of the mail fraud statute, which has expanded due to the breadth of
judicial interpretations of the scheme to defraud element. See id. at 457-58 (proposing a statutory
definition of scheme to defraud); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing
Story of the "Evolution" of a White Collar Crime, 21 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983) (enforcement
of mail fraud statute permits government to police invasions of privacy).
24
 The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1394 (1988 & Stipp. 1993), enacted as part of the
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This Article will review the history of the mail fraud statute and
discuss its early relationship to protecting the mails from misuse. It will
then analyze the Supreme Court's contradictory opinions that attempt
to define the degree of relationship between the fraudulent scheme
and the mailing. The Article will evaluate the effect of Congress's two
most recent amendments to the statute, the first that in large part
overturned the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation in McNally
of the scheme to defraud element, and the second in the Violent
Crime Act that sheds the last vestige of limitation on the mail fraud
statute to protect the integrity of the mails. The Article will address
important interpretive issues that courts will consider in determining how
far Congress intended to extend federal jurisdiction over fraudulent
schemes. It will suggest a proper scope of federal jurisdiction for
fraudulent schemes involving the use of interstate carriers that com-
ports with the language chosen by Congress in expanding the statute.
The Article also notes that the Violent Crime Act amendment has the
effect of utilizing the mail fraud statute as a means for Congress to
avoid writing comprehensive criminal laws that address specific activi-
ties worthy of criminal punishment. Instead, Congress has effectively
enacted the Federal Fraud Statute without debate or even considera-
tion of the need for such a provision.
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § I108(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2147 (1984), was the
first instance in which Congress based an anti-fraud provision on the mail fraud statute. The
Senate Report on the bank fraud statute notes that "[tlhe proposed bank fraud statute is modeled
on the present wire and inail fraud statutes which' have been construed by the courts to reach a
wide range of fraudulent activity." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 378 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3519. Unlike the mail fraud statute, however, the bank fraud statute
grounds federal jurisdiction on the status of the victim as a "financial institution" (as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 20 (1988 & Stipp. 1993)) subject to the regulation of the Federal Government, rather
than use of the mails or interstate carriers.
Recent proposals to reform the nation's health care system included a provision for increased
punishment for any "health care provider" who is convicted under the mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes for conduct in connection with the provision of or reimbursement for health care
services. See H.R. 1884, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993).
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 creates a new bankruptcy fraud statute that
incorporates the scheme to defraud element from the mail fraud statute. Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 312, 108 Stat. 4106, 4140 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 157).
Senator Metzenbaum, the sponsor of the new criminal provision, stated, The bankruptcy
fraud section, which is modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes, sets out criminal penalties
for any person who knowingly uses the filing of a bankruptcy petition or document to defraud
others." 140 Cox:. REC. 514,597 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); see
also 140 Cox:. Rae. H 10,772 (daily ed. Oct 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Berman) (citing a
Department of justice memorandum which states that the bankruptcy fraud provision was pat-
terned after the mail fraud statute and incorporates the requirement of proof of specific intent
to defraud).
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I. ORIGINS OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
For a statute of such wide-ranging application and expanding
utility for federal prosecutors, 25 the mail fraud statute descended from
quite modest origins.° In its most recent form prior to the Violent
Crime Act amendment, the statute stated in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes
or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing ... shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.27
Under this version of the statute, the Government had to prove that
the defendant participated in a scheme to defraud with the requi-
site intent, and the foreseeable use of the mails was in furtherance
of the scheme. 28
 The essential structure of the statute has remained
consistent since its enactment in 1872.
A. The Early Statutes
In 1868, Congress enacted legislation to prohibit use of the mails
to send letters or circulars for lotteries. 29 Four years later, as part of a
25
 Mr. Rakoff, a former federal economic crimes prosecutor, waxed eloquent over a decade
ago when, before its recent enhancements, he described the mail fraud statute as "our Stradivar-
ius, our Colt [ 145, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love." Rakoff, supra note
8, at 771.
26 See Hurson, supra note 12, at. 423 (statute was a "seemingly innocuous provision [1 in a
mundane revision of the postal code"). As an historical matter, the post-Civil War period involved
a rapid expansion of federal power, especially of the criminal law, into areas traditionally governed
by the states. Rakofl', supra note 8, at 779-81. A prime example of the new federal criminal
provisions enacted during the Reconstruction Period is the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Act of April
9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Slat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242). It was not
anomalous, therefore, for Congress to address an issue that had traditionally been regulated by
the states.
27 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
28 See Pereira v. United States, 347 U,S, I, 8 (1954) (describing elements of mail fraud);
United States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1989) (same). The Government is not required
to prove that the mailings were effective or that the scheme was successful. See United States v.
Durland, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896).
29
 Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Suit. 194, 196, stated: "Flit shall not be lawful to
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broad revision of the postal code, Congress adopted a new provision
creating a misdemeanor for "any person having devised or intending
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or [sic' be effected by
either opening or intending to open correspondence or communica-
tion with any other person . . by means of the post-office estab-
lishment of the United States . . . ."3°
No legislative history concerning the scope of the 1872 criminal
mail fraud statute or the relation of the use of the mails to the under-
lying fraud exists to aid interpretation of the statute.'' The language
of the original mail fraud statute, however, appears designed to protect
the post office from being abused as part of a fraudulent scheme. The
provision states that "such person, so misusing the post-office estab-
lishment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . "32
 Congress gave the
courts the power to proportion the punishment based on "the degree
in which the abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an instru-
ment into such fraudulent scheme and device."33
The House sponsor of the legislation stated that the provision was
designed "to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large
cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the pur-
poses of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people of the country.” 34
It appears highly unlikely, however, that Congress in 1872 believed that
the Federal Government should prosecute traditional state matters
that did not involve directly the federal post office. Potential constitu-
tional problems arising from interference with an area traditionally
regulated solely by the state governments may have been the principal
motivating factor behind Congress's limiting the anti-fraud provision
deposit in a post-office, to be sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so called
gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any kind on any pretext whatever."
As part of the general revision of statutes relating to the post office in 1872, Congress also
expanded the lottery law to prohibit use of the mail "concerning schemes devised and intended
to deceive and defraud the public for the purpose of obtaining money under false pretenses ...."
Act ofJune 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 283, 302. See Rakoff, supra note 8, at 782-83 (discussing
history of the lottery provisions).
30
 Act ofJune 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323.
31 See Rakoff, supra note 8, at 779 ("In view of the novelty and breadth of this section, it is
surprising that it generated no congressional debate or other legislative history explaining its
origins and purpose.").
32 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat, 283, 323 (1872) (emphasis supplied).
"Id. The caption for the new provision was "Penalty for Misusing the Post-Office Estab-
lishment."
34 CONG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35, (1870) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). Repre-
sentative Farnsworth's statement concerned a bill similar to the mail fraud statute introduced but
not passed by the preceding Congress. See Burson, supra note 12, at 424 n.8.
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to schemes which directly exploit the post office as a necessary element
for conviction."
Six years after the enactment of the mail fraud statute, the Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of the 1868 lottery law
in Ex parte Jackson." The Government argued that Congress's exclusive
power to regulate the mails, provided in Article I, § 8 of the Constitu-
tion, authorizes enactment of a criminal statute punishing misuse of
the post office."' The Court had no trouble agreeing with the Govern-
ment, holding that "[E.] he power possessed by Congress embraces the
regulation of the entire postal system of the country. The right to
designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to deter-
mine what shall be excluded."' The Court relied on this holding in In
re Rapier" to reject an argument that Congress lacked the power to
regulate acts involving the post office that traditionally had been sub-
ject to state criminal laws. 4° Thus, at least in the Supreme Court's view
in 1878, the constitutionality of the expansion of federal jurisdiction
over what had been state crimes was tied directly to Congress's power
to regulate the post office.
Although Ex parte Jackson eliminated most doubts as to the con-
stitutionality of the mail fraud statute, defendants challenged the na-
ture of the schemes charged in indictments as falling outside the scope
of the statute because of their attenuated relation to the post office.'"
35 See RAO; supra note 8, at 786 & n.65 ("It should not he forgotten that at the time of the
enactment of the original mail fraud statute in 1872, doubts of its constitutionality would have
been far from idle.").
36 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
37 See Ex parte Jackson, 90 U.S. at 729-32 (1878) (summarizing arguments of parties). The
defendant, convicted in federal court in New York lira depositing into the mail a circular advertising
lottery prizes, challenged the constitutionality of the lottery statute in a habeas corpus petition
to the Supreme Court. Id. at 728-29.
38 Id. at 732. The Court distinguished the lottery statute From regulations that interfere with
First. Amendment privileges, such as the freedom of the press, and Fourth Amendment protec-
tions from warrantless searches and seizures. All that Congress meant by this Act was, that the
mail should not be used to transport such corrupting publications and articles, and that anyone
who attempted to use it for that purpose should be punished." kJ. at 737.
After Jackson, only one reported decision discussed the constitutionality of the mail fraud
statute. See United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881 (N.D. III. 1884); see also Rakoff, supra note 8, at 788
(Jackson resolved any doubts about the constitutionality of the mail fraud statute).
59 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
40 Id. at 134. "It is not necessary that Congress should have the power to deal with crime or
immorality within the States in order to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of'
the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality." In reaching this conclusion, the
Court expressly reaffirmed its holding in Jackson. Id. at 133, 135.
41 See United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190, 190-91 (M.D. Pa. 1903) ("It is nut every fraudulent
scheme in which the mails may happen to be employed that is made an offense against the federal
law, but only such as are `to be effected' through that medium as an essential part."); United
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An early example of the limiting effect of requiring proof of misuse of
the post office to support a federal prosecution is United States v.
Owens.42
 In that case, the district court dismissed an indictment charg-
ing mail fraud for a scheme by which the defendant sought to mislead
a distillery into believing he had sent $162.50 through the mail when
in fact he only sent $.50. The court found the effort to encompass
within federal jurisdiction an individual dispute between a debtor and
creditor repugnant, stating that such a broad approach "may draw
within federal cognizance nearly all the commercial correspondence
of the country as to disputed demands and the value of remittances."'"
As the basis for its decision to limit the scope of the mail fraud statute,
the court noted "the degree in which the abuse of the post-office
establishment enters as an instrument into the fraudulent scheme."'"
Other courts concluding that the underlying scheme constituted
a fraud punishable under the statute noted that the key element was
the relationship of the mailing to the scheme. In United States v. fones, 45
the court stated that "the gist of the offence consists in the abuse of
the mail. The corpus delicti was the mailing of the letter in execution
of the unlawful scheme."" Similarly, the district court in United States
States v. Smith, 45 F. 561, 562 (ED. Wis. 1891) (fraudulent drug scheme advertised in newspapers
sent through post office not covered by the mail fraud statute); United States v. Mitchell, 36 F.
492, 493 (W.D. Pa. 1888) (scheme to defraud insurance company through mailing of premium
after accident and altering date on postage stamp not covered by statute because "something
more is necessary than the mere sending through the mail of a letter forming part, or designed
to aid in the perpetration, of a fraud"); cf, United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1882) (rejecting defendant's new trial motion and holding that counterfeit currency distribution
("green article") scheme was covered by the mail fraud statute when "the letter itself showed its
unlawful character").
42 17 F. 72 (E.D. Mo. 1883).
43 Id. at 74.
44 Id. (quoting Act of June 8, 1872, cit. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323). Mr. Rakoff argues that
during the thirty years after Congress enacted the snail fraud statute the lower courts were split
between "strict" and "broad" constructions regarding the relation of the scheme to the use of the
'nails. Rakoff, supra note 8, at 790-806. He uses this analysis to support his conclusion that
"continued emphasis upon the mailing aspects in interpreting the mail fraud statute is misplaced
and serves no useful function." Id. at 822. The language of the statute and the Supreme Court's
interpretations of it, however, recognize the relationship between the mailing and the scheme as
a substantive limitation on the scope of the statute. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974)
(mailings after completion of fraudulent scheme insufficient to support prosecution under mail
fraud statute); Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960) (routine mailings that would have
occurred in the absence of the scheme insufficient); Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944)
(mailings made after scheme came to fruition insufficient).
45
 10 F. 469 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1882).
46
 Id. at 470. The defendant mailed a letter offering to sell counterfeit money at a low price,
the currency then to be used by the purchaser. This type of fraud was known as a "green article"
scheme. See Rakoff, supra note 8, at 797.
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v. Lorin( stated that "Whe gist of this offense does not consist in the
fraudulent scheme alone, but in using the post-office establishment of
the United States for the purpose of executing a fraud." 4B The thrust
of the early decisions under the mail fraud statute was to require a
clear link between the fraudulent scheme and the misuse of the post
office as the predicate for federal prosecution:' 9
 Thus, insistence on a
relationship between the scheme and the misuse of the post office
constituted a substantive limitation on the Federal Government's power
to prosecute crimes that had traditionally been within the sole power
of the states.
B. Defining the Elements of Mail Fraud
Over the thirty years after Ex parteJackson upheld the constitution-
ality of the mail fraud statute, both Congress and the Supreme Court
have viewed the mailing requirement as a substantive limitation, rather
than just a jurisdictional element, on the exercise of federal prosecu-
torial powers. Congress first amended the statute in 1889, and provided
expressly that the statute included fraudulent schemes that involved
any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank notes, paper money,
or any obligation or security of the United States or of any
State, Territory, municipality, company, corporation, or per-
son . or any scheme or artifice to obtain money by or
through correspondence, by what is commonly called the
"sawdust swindle," or "counterfeit money fraud," or by deal-
ing or pretending to deal in what is commonly called "green
articles," "green coin," "bills," "paper goods," "spurious Treas-
ury notes," "United States goods," "green cigars," or any other
names or terms intended to be understood as relating to such
counterfeit or spurious articles . . . 5"
There is no legislative history for the amendment, so it is not
entirely clear whether Congress was reacting to restrictive lower court
decisions by identifying the specific types of fraud covered by the
statute or was providing additional guidance to law enforcement authori-
47 91 E 881 (N.D. Ill. 1884).
48 1(1. at 885. The scheme sought to induce investors to send money to a commodities
speculation fund which defendants would divert to their own use. Id,
49 But see Rakoff , supra note 8, at 795-806 (arguing that courts were split between strict and
broad construction of the meaning of scheme to defraud through their interpretation of the
mailing element).
50 Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873.
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ties and courts as to the schemes it contemplated being punished in
federal courts. After the amendment, however, one lower court held
that the specificity of the enumerated schemes meant that the "general
language of the act must be limited to such schemes and artifices as
are ejusdem generis with those named."51 The district court noted that
the term "scheme to defraud" might have covered the acts for which
the defendant was indicted, but because they were not similar to those
described in the amended mail fraud statute the indictment had to be
dismissed. 52
In Stokes v. United States," the Supreme Court rejected such a
restrictive reading of the statute. Instead, the Court found that a
violation of the mail fraud statute requires proof of three elements:
(1) That the persons charged must have devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud. (2) That they must have intended to effect
this scheme, by opening or intending to open correspon-
dence with some other person through the post office estab-
lishment, or by inciting such other person to open commu-
nication with them. (3) And that, in carrying out such scheme,
such person must have either deposited a letter or packet in
the post office, or taken or received one therefrom."
In Durland v. United States," decided one year later, the Court
reaffirmed its analysis in Stokes, and enlarged the scope of the statute
by reading the fraudulent scheme element broadly. In Durland, the
defendant mailed advertisements to purchase bonds that misstated
the expected investment return. The Supreme Court read the phrase
"scheme to defraud" more broadly than the common law crime of false
pretenses, which only involves a misrepresentation of past or present
facts, but not statements about future events. 56 The Court stated:
St United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160, 161 (D. Colo. 1895).
52 /d. at 160-61. In Culp v. United States, 82 F. 990, 991 (3d Cir. 1897), however, the circuit
court stated that "the purpose of the amendment was not to restrict, but to extend, the operation
of the statute." Compare Milhy v. United States, 120 F. 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1903) (effect of amendment
was to extend statute, and not to diminish the force of its original terms not in conflict with the
amendment") with Stockton v. United States, 205 F. 462, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1913) (rejecting Milby's
analysis of the effect of the 1889 amendment).
5t 157 U.S. 187 (1895).
54 Id. at 188-89.
55 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
513 Id. at 313; see ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 369 (1982) ("Only
what exists now or has existed in the past is a fact, at least insofar as this term is used in the law.
Hence any statement which refers solely to the future is not a misrepresentation of fact.").
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It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all
such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post
office from being used to carry them into effect, that the
statute was passed; and it would strip it of value to confine it
to such cases as disclosed an actual misrepresentation as to
some existing fact, and exclude those in which is only the
allurement of a specious and glittering promise. This, which
is the principal contention of counsel, must be overruled."
The Court went on to consider the nature of the proof necessary
for the mailing element of the offense: "We do not wish to be under-
stood as intimating that in order to constitute the offense it must be
shown that the letters so mailed were of a nature calculated to be
effective in carrying out the fraudulent scheme." 5s It was sufficient if
the defendant deposited letters in the post office that he believed "may
assist" in effecting the scheme."
In Durland, the Court shifted the intent inquiry to the scheme to
defraud element. That is, the defendant's misstatements as to future
value were covered by the statute because he intended to mislead
investors. The mailing element was a component of the execution, but
the Court was unwilling to require proof of a separate intent to use the
mails in addition to the intent to execute the fraudulent scheme.
Nevertheless, the Court states clearly that the purpose of the statute is
to "prevent the post office from being used to carry" out fraudulent
schemes. 5°
Congress amended the mail fraud statute again in 1909 and made
essentially three changes."' First, Congress incorporated the Supreme
Court's holding in Durland that the scope of punishable activities
included acts "for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." f2
 Second, the stat-
ute dispensed with an element of the offense, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Stokes, by eliminating the language requiring proof
that the scheme would be "effected by either opening or intending to
open correspondence or communication with any other person . . . by
means of the post-office establishment of the United States . . "63 In
57 Durland, 161 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
58 a at 315.
59 Id.
fd. at 314.
61 Aci of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130.
62 Id. See Michael C. Bennett, Note, Barre v. United States: An Improper Interpretation of Property
Rights, 42 DEPAut. L. Rm.,. 1499, 1506 (1993).
63 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323.
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its place, Congress substituted language requiring that the mails be
used "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempt-
ing so to do."64
 Durland had effectively limited part of the mailing
element already by only requiring that the mailing "assist" in the
completion of the fraud. The amended provision reflected congres-
sional agreement with the Court's most recent interpretation of the
statute.
Third, Congress streamlined the language and removed unneces-
sary verbiage. Much of the language in the earlier versions of the
statute amounted to surplus beyond the requirement that the Govern-
ment prove that the defendant mailed or caused a mailing for the
purpose of completing the scheme. Specific references to misuse of
the post office and conditioning the punishment on an ephemeral
estimate of the degree of such misuse were unnecessary to a clear
description of the crime.
Commentators have argued that the 1909 changes reduced the
mailing element to merely a jurisdictional requirement, in that use of
the mails no longer served as a substantive limitation on federal prose-
cution.65 The language of the statute, however, does not indicate that
Congress understood the 1909 changes to be so drastic. The amended
mail fraud statute did not completely eliminate the required nexus
between the scheme to defraud and the mailing element, nor did it
explicitly reduce the use of the mails to a mere predicate for federal
jurisdiction.
Legislative history to the 1909 amendment to the mail fraud
statute does not exist, but Durland and Stokes make it clear that the
Supreme Court considered the mailing element to be a substantive
limitation on the scope of the crime. To the extent that the 1909
amendment incorporated Durland's more expansive understanding of
"scheme to defraud," that does not demonstrate that Congress also
sought to expand the statute even further by making the mailing
element simply a jurisdictional requirement, thereby overruling the
analysis in Durland and Stokes. Rather, given Congress's general ap-
proval of Durland, the better conclusion is that Congress adopted the
" Act  of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130.
65 See Rakoff, supra note 8, at 817 ("the mailing requirement functioned as nothing more
than a simple 'jurisdictional element' plus 'overt act'—the conduct minimally necessary to permit
the exercise of federal sovereignty and to distinguish the crime of mail fraud from one of pure
intent"); Jeffrey]. Dean & Doye E. Green, Jr., Note, McNally v. United States and Its Effect on the
Federal Mail Fraud Statute: Will White Collar Criminals Get a Break?, 39 MERCER L. REV. 697, 702
(1988) (removal of mailing language in amendment "leaves the statute so bare that it can only
be seen as a tool to fight corruption and not as a means of protecting the integrity of the 'nails").
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Supreme Court's consistent view of the mailing element as a substan-
tive limitation on the scope of the statute. 66
After the 1909 amendment of the mail fraud statute, the Supreme
Court shed little light on the degree of interdependence required
between the scheme to defraud and the use of the mails. In United
States v. Young;"7 the Court noted that the recently amended mail fraud
statute required proof of two elements, not the three elements de-
scribed in the earlier versions of the statute. The Court acknowledged
that the defendant need not intend that the post office be used, as was
earlier required.68 The Court did not, however, discuss how the second
element, that the mailing be for the purpose of executing the scheme,
should be understood. The lower court had dismissed the indictment
because it appeared to have read the statute too narrowly, requiring,
among other things, that the Government prove that the false state-
ments actually induced the victim of the fraud to purchase worthless
notes offered by the defendant.R9 Young gave little guidance on the rela-
tionship between the statutory elements created in the 1909 amend-
ment beyond its acknowledgment, in reversing the district court's
dismissal of the indictment, that Congress had streamlined the ele-
ments of the offense. 7°
66 Compare Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. U. Rev. 223,240 (1992) (It
is without doubt that the statute requires some relationship between the mailing and the scheme
to defraud") with Rakoff, supra note 8, at 819 ("The truth, however, is that at least since the 1909
amendment, the sole genuine purpose of the mail fraud statute has been to prosecute fraud and
the mailing has served primarily as a basis for invoking federal jurisdiction.").
The analysis in Ex par(e Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), and In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892),
concerning the constitutionality of the lottery laws shows that the Supreme Court interpreted
Congress's power to regulate the mails to include "the right to determine what shall be excluded."
Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732. The single reference in the 1909 amendment to the use of the mails fir
the purpose of executing the scheme may be attributed to the fact that Congress was not as
reticent, due to constitutional concerns, to write a broad statute as it was when it first passed the
mail fraud statute in 1872.
67 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
68 hi. at 161.
6° Id. at 162. The defendant sent financial statements that inflated the value of his company
to a brokerage firm that in turn attempted to sell the company's bonds to other investors. Id. at
156-57.
7" Mr. Rakoff argues that after Young, narrow interpretations of the scope of the mail fraud
statute based on the mailing element are "built like sandcastles upon the infirmities of the
language of the prior statute, [and] come tumbling down now that supporting language has been
washed away." Rakoff, supra note 8, at 817. That analysis, however, appears to read too much into
Young. The district court in that case imposed a number of burdens on the Government that
could not be supported by any reasonable reading of the statute, including proof of actual
reliance by the victim. Young, 232 U.S. at 162. The Supreme Court did not specify which among
a number of errors rendered the district court's opinion erroneous, stating only, In this the
[district] court was in error." Id.
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The 1909 amendment to the mail fraud statute was the last sig-
nificant change until 1988, when Congress, after the Supreme Court's
decision in McNally, added a new provision extending the reach of the
scheme to defraud element to include schemes to deprive victims of
the "right of honest services." 7 ' Although the wording of the statute
remained essentially unchanged over the next 80 years, the Supreme
Court has been unable to agree on a clear analysis of the connection
required between the mailing element and the execution of the fraud.
II. THE SUPREME COURT STRUGGLES WITH THE MAILING ELEMENT
The mail fraud statute is cryptic about the relationship between
the scheme and the mailing, requiring that the Government prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of the mails be "for the
purpose of executing such scheme." 72 Although the Supreme Court's
decisions in the nineteenth century make clear that protection of the
post office underpins the statute, and therefore that the mailing ele-
ment was not merely jurisdictional, the requisite degree of interde-
pendence between the two elements was never clear. For example, the
Court held in Pereira v. United States" that the mailing need not be "an
essential part of the scheme,"74 while in Badders v. United States it stated
that the mailing could suffice "if it is a step in a plot." 75 The use of the
mails had to be foreseeable, but the defendant need not personally
make or receive the charged mailing to be prosecuted.76 Mailings that
were routine or otherwise required by law might be insufficient to
The procedural posture of Youngmay explain the Court's peremptory treatment of the scope
of the amended statute. The case reached the Court on direct appeal, tinder the Criminal Appeals
Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 3731), as amended by Act of Jan. 2,
1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890, which permitted the United States to bring direct
appeals to the Supreme Court challenging, among other things, dismissal of an indictment before
jeopardy attaches. The defendant did not enter an appearance before the Court. The opinion
contains no real legal analysis, simply reiterating the statements of the district court in dismissing
the indictment and the Solicitor General's argument on the scope of the statute. Young does not
support an expansive reading of the mail fraud statute that reduces the mailing element to a
jurisdictional requirement only, especially when that reading is not supported by any explicit
statement by Congress to that effect when it amended the mail fraud statute.
is U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 126-69, of recent
amendments to the mail fraud statute.
72 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
73 547 U.S. I (1954).
74 Id. at 8.
75 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
76 See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9 ("Where one does an act with knowledge that the use of the
mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen,
even though not actually intended, then he 'causes' the mails to be used."). Compare United
States v. Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1992) (fact that defendant did not mail item
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support a mail fraud prosecution," and they had to occur during the
course of the fraud and not as a subsequent byproduct of the under-
lying transactions.78 There was no simple means to discern the relation-
ship between the elements, and the Supreme Court struggled to ar-
ticulate a consistent analysis for describing the requisite degree of
"purpose" necessary for conduct to fall within the statute. 79
A. A First Attempt to Delineate Purpose
In Kann v. United States," the Supreme Court first overturned a
conviction based on the remoteness of the mailing element to the
fraudulent scheme. The defendant, president of a munitions company,
challenged his mail fraud conviction based on diverting funds due to
his company under a government contract. One of the defendant's
co-conspirators cashed a check at a bank for a portion of the diverted
proceeds, and the mailing charged in the indictment was made by the
depositary bank to the drawee bank. The Court held that "[i]t was
immaterial to [defendant], or to any consummation of the scheme,
how the bank which paid or credited the check would collect from the
drawee bank."8 ' The mail fraud statute does not reach all Frauds,
according to the Court, "but only those limited instances in which the
use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud, leaving all other
cases to be dealt with by appropriate state law."" Four Justices dis-
sented, arguing that the mailing was part of a continuing venture."
irrelevant where use of mails was foreseeable) with United States v. Smith, 934 F.2d 270, 273 (11th
Cir. 1991) (mailings by bank insufficient to support prosecution where defendant did not know
insurer's administrative procedure and its use of the snails was not common knowledge).
77 See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 391 (1960) ("we think it cannot he said that mailings
made or caused to be made under the imperative command of duty imposed by state law are
criminal under the federal mail fraud statute, even though some of those who are so required to
do the mailing for the District plan to steal, when or after received, some indefinite part of its
moneys"). But see United States v. Freitag, 768 F.2d 240, 244 (upholding mail fraud conviction
where mailings related to a legitimate business purpose).
7$ See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 402 (1974) (defendant's scheme reached fruition
before the mailings occurred); Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944) (mailing after
completion of fraud); United States v. Manarite, 44 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (scheme to
obtain casino gambling chips through false credit application filed on a weekend insufficient to
support a conspiracy to commit snail fraud charge when the scheme was completed upon receipt
of the $5,000 credit advance and the cashing of the chips").
79 Parr, 363 U.S. at 397 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The adequate degree of relationship
between a mailing which occurs during the life of a scheme and the scheme is of course not a
matter susceptible of geometric determination.").
au 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
$1 Id. at 94.
82 Id.
89 Id. at 96 (Douglas, j., dissenting).
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While the majority called the mailing "merely incidental and collat-
eral," the dissent termed it "crucial to the total success of the fraudu-
lent project."84
A decade later, in Pereira v. United States," the Supreme Court
considered the issue of the foreseeability of the mailing, rather than
whether the mailings were part of the fraudulent scheme. The defen-
dants engaged in a classic amorous confidence game with an older
widow, concocting an elaborate story about investments in a hotel and
oil fields. After her marriage to one of the defendants, the victim gave
money to the defendants to "purchase" a hotel in Texas." One defen-
dant, the meretricious husband, received a $35,000 check from the
victim drawn on a California bank, which he deposited in a bank in
Texas; the Texas bank mailed the check to the California bank, and
after it cleared the defendant withdrew the funds and disappeared. 81
The defendants argued that they did not foresee the Texas bank's
mailing, and therefore they could not be convicted under the mail
fraud statute. The Court's cursory analysis of the mailing issue did not
include any reference to Kann. The principal holding was that mailings
in the ordinary course of business are "foreseeable," but the Court did
not discuss the degree to which the mailings served the purpose of
executing the scheme.88
The distinguishing characteristic between the mailings in Kann
and Pereira is that in the former case the defendant received the funds
upon cashing the check, and the depositary bank became the "owner"
of the instrument." In Pereira, the defendants had to wait until the
check had cleared after the mailing from the Texas bank (depositary)
to the California bank (drawee) before they could withdraw the funds."
The willingness of one institution to honor a check by paying or
84 Id. at 95, 96 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
88 Id. at 3-5. The Court went into enormous detail about the scheme, probably to ensure
that the defendants would not generate a shred of sympathy.
97 /d. at 5.
88 Id. at 8-9. The only reference to the "purpose" element is the conclusory statement that
"the scheme to defraud is established, and the mailing of the check by the bank, incident to an
essential part of the scheme, is established." Id, at 8. The defendants do not appear to have relied
on Kann in making their argument to overturn the conviction. See Brief for Petitioners, 98 L.
Ed. 435, 438 (1954).
89 Kann, 323 U.S. at 94. The Court noted its reliance on the commercial law of negotiable
instruments.
9° Perth-a, 347 U.S. at 8. The Court does not go into detail about the commercial practices
involved, but the timing of the withdrawal after the mailing of the check from the Texas bank to
the California bank appears to be the basis for treating Pereira differently from Kann. The Fifth
Circuit based its analysis of the mail fraud count on the delay between deposit in Texas and
honoring in California. See Pereira, 202 F.2d at 836.
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crediting it immediately while another provides only a provisional
credit until it determines that the check will not be dishonored seems
an odd line to draw in deciding whether or not a mailing is for the
purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme. This is especially the case
when the defendant is completely divorced from the depositary bank's
decision of what type of credit it will extend to the defendant on the
check. While each case clearly involved fraudulent conduct, the dis-
tinction between Kann and Pereira is one based on commercial law and
the happenstance of internal bank procedure, rather than a principled
analysis of the relationship of the mailing to the underlying scheme.
B. Timing in Life Is Not Everything
In Parr v. United States, 9 ' the Supreme Court once again consid-
ered the meaning of the mailing element, this time asking whether
routine mailings that would otherwise take place could form the basis
for a mail fraud conviction. The individual defendants were members
of a school board who diverted public moneys collected through tax
assessments for their own purposes. 92 The mailings charged in. the
indictment were the tax assessments, tax statements, checks, and re-
ceipts issued for taxes paid that were sent by the school board.• The
Court quoted Durland that the purpose of the mail fraud statute was
"to prevent the post office from being used to carry [such schemes]
into effect."94 The status of the mailings governed the Court's analysis,
leading it to note that
it cannot be said that mailings made or caused to be made
under the imperative command of duty imposed by state law
are criminal under the federal mail fraud statute, even though
some of those who are so required to do the mailing for the
District plan to steal, when or after received, some indefinite
part of its moneys. 95
91 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
92 Id. at 374-75.
" Id. at 385. The Court noted: "It is clear and undisputed that the School Board was under
an express constitutional mandate to levy and collect taxes for the acquisition of facilities for, and
to maintain and operate, the schools of the District ... and was required by statute to issue
statements for such taxes and to deliver receipts upon payment." Id. at 387.
" Id. at 389 (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306,314 (1896)). Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent noted that "[w]hile the Mail Fraud Act is directed against the utilization of the 'nails
in carrying out a fraudulent scheme, the penal prohibition of the use of the 'nails for a fraud
does not turn on the niceties of the common-law offense of obtaining money or goods under
false pretenses . ." Id. at 400 (citing Durland).
55 Id. at 391.
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The Court did not explain why mailings required by law cannot
constitute mail fraud, but the opinion does note that the defendants
did not increase the taxes assessed or otherwise impose illegal taxes
as part of their scheme."
Parr makes clear that, at least for a scheme involving a required
mailing, the timing or the necessity of the mailing for the scheme to
move forward does not constitute the use of the mails for the "purpose"
of executing the fraud required by the statute. Justice Frankfurter
dissented, stating that "[f]or the purposes of the statute, the significance
of the relationship between scheme and mailing depends on the inter-
connection of the parts in a particular scheme."97 Justice Frankfurter
argued that the majority's interpretation "artificially and unreasonably
contracted" the statute because the defendants embodied the school
district that made the mailings charged in the indictment. 98 Under the
analysis proposed by Justice Frankfurter, the timing of the mailings is
crucial to the scope of the statute, and when they occur during the
course of the scheme's execution, the mail fraud statute applies to the
illegal conduct.
The Court returned to the timing issue two years later in United
States v. Sampson," a case that involved a fraudulent "advance fee" loan
scheme. In that case, the defendants took fees and loan applications
from small businesses for the purpose of arranging loans and then sent
"accepted" applications back to the businesses with a letter stating that
the loans were in process.'" The Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that under Kann and Parr, a mailing after the victim's money or
property has been secured cannot support a charge under the mail
fraud statute)" The Court held that mailings "for the purpose of
lulling [victims] by assurances that the promised services would be
performed" were "for the purpose of executing" a fraudulent scheme)° 2
The mailings, however, appear to be superfluous to the scheme.
Once the defendants obtained their "advance fees" from the busi-
w Parr, 363 U.S. at 391. The Court pointed out that this was a "unique" case, and the
defendants' scheme did not involve "taxes assessed and collected [that] were in excess of the
District's needs or that they were 'padded' or in any way unlawful."
97 Id. at 398 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justices Harlan and Stewart joined the dissent. Id.
at 394.
98 Id. at 401 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99 371 U.S. 75 (1962).
100 Id. at 77-78. The Court noted that, according to the allegations, "these defendants were
not mere small-time, sporadic swindlers hut rather they have deliberately planned and devised a
well-integrated, long-range, and effective scheme for the use of propaganda, salesmen, and other
techniques to soften up and then cheat their victims one by one." Id. at 77.
tot
	 at 80.
1 °2 Id. at 81.
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nesses, the fraud was complete. The Court described the mailings as
"lulling" acts, but that does not change the nature of the scheme
charged in the indictment, unless the mailings somehow altered the
fraudulent scheme to incorporate both payment of the fees and con-
tinuing contacts with the victims. Justice Douglas' dissent in Sampson
asserted that the use of the mails was weaker than that in Parr, in which
the Court reversed the conviction, because of the absence of any real
possibility that the victims in Sampson could be defrauded again by the
defendants.ws He also bemoaned the use of the mail fraud statute to
prosecute crimes federally "in fields that are essentially local."104 In-
deed, the lulling effect of the mailings, the basis for federal jurisdic-
tion, is a generalized act by any con artist to maintain the facade of
normalcy, but is otherwise unrelated to the conduct of the scheme."''
As the Court had in the earlier pairing of Kann and Pereira, its
decisions in Parrand Sampson provide no guidance on how to interpret
the relationship of the mailing to the fraudulent scheme. The Court
avoided a timing test, such as that proposed by Justice Frankfurter in
Parr, apparently because it would unduly restrict the flexibility of the
statute in reaching schemes that intentionally used mailings occurring
after the completion of the scheme. That the defendants in Sampson
clearly contemplated the mailings, and were directly responsible for
them, seems to have influenced the Court to find that the mailings
were for the purpose of executing the scheme, despite its completion
upon receipt of the fees. The flip side of the timing rule would be to
make any mailing during the course of a scheme sufficient for the
mailing element, even if it were as inevitable as the taxes in Parr.
C. Maintaining Inconsistency
1. Post-Scheme Mailings
In United States v. Maze, 106
 the Supreme Court considered whether
a mailing that the defendant knowingly "caused" was sufficiently re-
lated to the underlying fraud to fall within the mail fraud statute. The
103 Id. at 82-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas contrasted the use of the mail to
"tranquilize" the victims in Sampson with the goal in Parr to continue the scheme, concluding
that Sampson was "a much weaker case than Parr."
1°4
	 371 U.S. at 83 (Douglas,_]., dissenting).
1(16
 Even after the scheme is accomplished, one may wish to pull the scam again on another
victim rather than admitting the acts were fraudulent. If the Court's decision in Sampson means
that any mailing after the effective completion of the scheme that is not inculpatory is lulling,"
and therefore extends the life of the scheme, then the mailing limitation loses virtually all
substantive meaning.
1 °6 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
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defendant took his roommate's credit card and car, and, signing the
roommate's name to the charge vouchers, obtained food and lodg-
ing during an extended sojourn.'" Each of the merchants who fur-
nished goods and services to the defendant mailed the invoices to a
bank in Louisville, Kentucky, which formed the basis for the mail fraud
counts. 1°8
 The indictment specifically charged that the delay in mail-
ing the invoices and the billing to the roommate "would enable [Maze]
to continue purchasing goods and services for an appreciable period
of time," an attempt to bring the mailings within the holding in
Sampson.
The Court rejected the argument that the mailings were designed
to permit the scheme to continue, holding that the defendant's "scheme
reached fruition when he checked out of the motel, and there is no
indication that the success of his scheme depended in any way on
which of his victims ultimately bore the loss.""° The Court noted that
sending the invoices to Kentucky was not meant to "lull" the victims in
any way, as distinguished from the mailings in Sampson.
The Court stated that "Congress could have drafted the mail fraud
statute so as to require only that the mails be in fact used as a result
of the fraudulent scheme. But it did not do this . . ."'" The Court
refused to read the mailing element as merely a jurisdictional require-
ment for federal prosecution, instead stating that the mailings were
not for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. As a conse-
quence, the Court failed to explain the degree of interdependence
necessary for a conviction. Although the Court declined to expand the
boundaries of the mail fraud statute, it did nothing to improve the
understanding of an imprecise element of a federal crime."'
' 07 Id. at 396. The defendant incurred charges in California, Florida, and Louisiana after his
"fancy lightly turned to thoughts of the sunny Southland." Id.
1 " ld. The indictment charged four counts of mail fraud and one count of transporting a
stolen vehicle under 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1988).
109 Maze, 414 U.S. at 397.
11 ° Id. at 402.
III Id. at 405 (footnote omitted).
112justice White dissented, arguing that the scheme had not reached fruition because the
fraud was perpetrated on the owner of the credit card, and therefore the mailings were part of
the execution of the scheme. Id. at 411-13 (White, J., dissenting). His analysis focused principally
on the timing of the mailings by more broadly defining the fraudulent scheme so as to permit
the mailings to be incorporated as part of the scheme's execution. It is not clear, however, that
simply defining the scope of the fraud more broadly means that any mailing becomes a mailing
for the purpose of executing the scheme, especially in light of the conclusion in Parr that routine
mailings will not support a mail fraud prosecution.
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2. Mail Fraud as a Stop-Gap Provision
The vagueness of the mailing element, even after Maze, meant that
little prevented an expansive application of the statute to an ever wider
variety of conduct. The fraud element of the statute had always been
interpreted quite broadly, based on the classic definition that actions
that deviate from standards of "moral uprightness, of fundamental
honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general business life of
members of society" can form the basis of a prosecution. is The histori-
cal limitation that the mails be used for the "purpose of executing the
scheme" could provide at least some check on the application of
federal power. Yet the mail fraud statute was assuming increased im-
portance as a means to extend jurisdiction to activities that had not
been subject to federal prosecution.
Chief Justice Burger argued in his dissent in Maze that the mail
fraud statute required an expansive definition to permit federal prose-
cutors to reach activities until Congress passed more definitive legisla-
tion to address the problem."' The stop-gap nature of the mail fraud
statute is apparent in Maze, in which a recently enacted credit card
fraud provision had been passed by Congress after the defendant's
adventure, and therefore the mail fraud statute provided the only
means to reach the misuse of the stolen charge cards. 15 Yet, Chief
Justice Burger also argued that even after passage of a more specific
statute "the federal mail fraud statute should have a place in dealing
with fraudulent credit card use." 10 Under this interpretation the breadth
of the mail fraud statute presents a temptation to rely on the creativity
of prosecutors to apply it to a wider range of questionable conduct.
That approach allows Congress to avoid the more cumbersome task of
writing specific laws that will address an identified area of criminal
activity that requires the application of federal, rather than just state
or local, resources.
3. Expanding the Scope of the Scheme to Include the Mailings
Rather than use the mailing element as a means to limit federal
prosecutions, the Court in Schmuck v. United States"' once again re-
I ° Gregory v. United States, 253 F.24 104,109 (5111 Cir. 1958).
114 Maze, 414 U.S. at 405-07 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
1
 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1988) (original version at Pub, 1,, No. 91-508, § 502(a), 84 Stat. 1114,
1127 (1970)).
us Maze, 414 U.S. at 407 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
u7 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
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versed field on the use of the mails, finding that mailings at best
tangentially related to the underlying fraud could support a mail fraud
prosecution. In Schmuck, the defendant sold to auto dealers used cars
in which he had rolled back the odometers to inflate the vehicle's
value. The auto dealers sent title application forms to the state depart-
ment of transportation to register the cars after the dealers sold them
to individual purchasers."' The Court held that the ultimate sales of
the vehicles
naturally depended on the successful passage of title among
the various parties. Thus, although the registration-form mail-
ing may not have contributed directly to the duping of either
the retail dealers or the customers, they were necessary to the
passage of title, which in turn was essential to the perpetu-
ation of Schmuck's scheme."'
The Court distinguished Kann, Parr, and Maze on the ground that
the mailings related to a key step in the process, the passage of title
upon the ultimate sale of the vehicle, and that the defendant needed
to maintain the continuing trust and goodwill of the dealers to
whom he sold cars. The Court effectively adopted a subjective test
or the purpose element, stating that the relevant question is whether
the "mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by
the perpetrator at the time. "120
The Court's analysis in Schmuck effectively reduces the mailing
element to a mere jurisdictional requirement. The mailings underpin-
ning the prosecution bore no relation to the odometer tampering at
the root of the fraud. The mailings, a happenstance of the state's
registration system, were completely unaffected by the defendant's
actions. Unlike Maze, where the mailings would not have occurred "but
for" the misuse of the stolen credit card, the use of the mails for the
registration forms was a purely ministerial act that would occur regard-
less of the defendant's fraudulent conduct. Indeed, the Court had to
incorporate the defendant's need to maintain goodwill with the auto
dealers to argue plausibly that the mailings were for the purpose of
executing the scheme. Otherwise, the fraud came to fruition upon the
transfer of the vehicles to the dealers, a point well before any mailings
118 /d. at 707-08.
11 " Id. at 712.
120 Id. at 715; see Podgor, supra note 66, at 257-58 ("The majority in Schmuck chose to proceed
with a subjective examination of the scheme as a totality, as opposed to an objective inquiry into
whether the mailings were after the fact.").
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occurred. 121 Justice Scalia, in dissent, attacked the breadth of the ma-
jority opinion, arguing that "it is mail fraud, not mail and fraud, that
incurs liability. This federal statute is not violated by a fraudulent
scheme in which, at some point, a mailing happens to occur ... "122
Given the Supreme Court's alternating pattern of narrow and
broad readings of the mailing element, the requirement that the mails
be used for the purpose of executing the scheme should retain some
vitality as a substantive limitation on the mail fraud statute. The Court,
however, has failed to provide any real guidance as to the degree or
the nature of the interrelationship between the two elements required
for a conviction.'" Interpreting the mailing element as solely a juris-
dictional requirement, combined with the breadth of the fraud ele-
ment, could create a federal statute of almost unlimited application,
constrained solely by the prosecutor's ability to find some mailing that
can be used as the basis for federal jurisdiction. If Schmuck is taken at
face value as the definitive interpretation of the mailing element, then
the mail fraud statute appears a virtually unlimited grant of power to
federal prosecutors to define an activity as fraudulent and to search
for any mailing that is some part of the scheme, no matter how trivial.
If Schmuck is the final word, then the mailing element is little more
than a nuisance that the Government may prove almost as an after-
thought in its case.
The approach taken in Schmuck is at odds with both the historical
basis of the mail fraud statute discussed above, and with the approach
taken by courts in interpreting other federal criminal provisions. As a
comparison, the bank fraud statute, consciously patterned after the
mail fraud statute,' 24 requires that a federally insured financial institu-
tion be the victim of the scheme. Every use of a bank as part of a
121 See Podgor, supra note 66, at 262 (after Schmuck, "mail fraud convictions may turn on the
distastefulness of the fraud, as opposed to whether the mailing actually served to further the
fraudulent scheme").
122 Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The plausibility of the majority's analysis
becomes all the more questionable when juxtaposed to Sampson, in which the defendants were
directly responsible for the mailings that could have maintained the facade they had erected. In
Schmuck, however, the mailings were one transaction away from the defendant's fraud and
possibly weeks or months removed from the odometer tampering. Under Schmuck, any mailing
traceable to the original fraudulent transaction, save perhaps an inculpatory statement, will
support federal prosecution.
123 See Podgor, supra note 66, at 269 ("despite legal scholars being unable to predict the
future interpretation of the mail fraud statute, people are being sent to jail for violation of the
statute").
12 ' 1 See H. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 378 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3519 ("The proposed hank fraud statute is modeled on the present wire and mail fraud
statutes which have been construed by the courts to reach a wide range of fraudulent activity.").
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broader fraud does not constitute a violation of the bank fraud statute
because the courts have interpreted the requirement that the scheme
be "to defraud a financial institution" to mean that the facilities of a
bank cannot be just an incidental aspect of the course of conduct.'"
Just as the bank fraud statute requires a direct correlation between the
scheme and a financial institution, so should the mail fraud statute
require an equally direct correlation between the scheme and use of
the mails. Rather than serve as a tangential element, use of the mails
should be central to the fraudulent scheme before the statute will allow
a federal prosecution of any given fraud.
M. THE FEDERAL FRAUD STATUTE: CONGRESS BROADENS THE
HORIZONS OF 18 U.S.C. § 1341
Congress has expanded the scope of the mail fraud statute twice
in recent years, making the provision the preeminent criminal statute
for federal prosecutors. The statute had remained essentially unchanged
since the codification in 1909 of Durland's holding that the fraud
element encompassed misstatements of future value.' 26 Moreover, the
changes enacted by Congress reflect an evolving view of the mail fraud
statute as a substantive provision to combat fraud rather than just a
stopgap measure that may suffice until more specific legislation can be
drafted to deal with the conduct. This new approach makes the mailing
element of the statute all the more important because it is the only
real limitation on the power of the Federal Government to prosecute
the broad array of behavior that can be categorized as "fraud."
A. The Fall and Rise of the Intangible Rights Doctrine
1. McNally and the Limits of a Scheme to Defraud
Beginning in the 1970s, federal prosecutors began using the mail
fraud statute to attack political corruption at the federal, state, and
125 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. 1993); see United States v. Briggs, 939 F.2d 222, 225 (5th
Cir. 1991) (theft of funds from employer's bank account is not a scheme to defraud a financial
institution); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1988) (funds legally
withdrawn from a bank by victim of fraudulent scheme insufficient to support prosecution under
bank fraud statute).
126 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357 n.6 (1988). Congress amended the statute in
1948 to eliminate the language specifying various fraudulent schemes, e.g., "green article" scams,
that had been added in 1889. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 683, 763. Congress
also substituted the phrase "postal service" for "post office department" to reflect the reorgani-
zation of the postal service in 1970 as a quasi-independent corporation rather than a cabinet-level
department. Act of August 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § (6) (j) (11), 84 Stat. 719, 778.
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local level.' 27 The theory of prosecution was that governmental officials
who received kickbacks or other gratuities in connection with their
offices or duties engaged in a scheme to defraud the citizenry of its
right to honest and faithful services.'" The deprivation was of an
intangible right, not a property right, and the scheme involved the
official's breach of a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the corrupt
activity.' 29 Courts expanded the intangible rights doctrine to reach
breaches of fiduciary duties by employees's° and professionals who
owe clients a duty of loyalty and candor.''' The intangible rights doc-
trine was strongly criticized by commentators,'" but the circuit courts
127 See Hurson, .supra note 12, at 429-30 (reviewing development of the intangible rights
doctrine).
12 The first published opinion to adopt this analysis was Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d
110, 114-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941), in which the defendants were convicted
under the mail fraud statute lbr a scheme to bribe commissioners of a levee district to adopt the
defendants' plan for refunding bonds. See Bennett, supra note 62, at 1508 n. 70.
129 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (local Republican party
leader), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v, Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Detroit-area Congressman), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir.) (Maryland Governor), different results reached on rehk, en bane., by an equally
divided court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v.
Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir, 1975) (bribery of state Secretary of State); United States v. Keane,
522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (Chicago city Alderman), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 746 (1976).
L'w See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2(1 777 (2d Cir,) (corporate officer), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 944 (1985); United States v. Von Banta, 635 F.2(1 999 (2(1 Cir, 1980) (securities trader), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Bryia, 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975) (purchasing
agent), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.)
(purchasing agent), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973). See generally White Collar Crime Survey, supra
note 18, at 709-11 (reviewing scope of intangible rights doctrine). One of the first decisions
applying intangible rights theory in the private sector was United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass, 1942), in which a company was indicted under the mail fraud statute
for paying bribes to a competitor's employeeS in order to obtain confidential business informa-
tion. The district court stated that the charged scheme sought to defraud the competitor of its
employees' "honest and loyal" services. Id. at 678.
131 Perhaps the must famous case involving the expansive use of' the intangible rights theory
as applied to an outside professional is United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). The defendant, an attorney and New York state Senator, was
convicted of mail fraud for giving legal advice to a personal client when his firm was representing
another client competing for a city contract with the defendant's client. Id. at 922-23. The breach
of fiduciary duty involved solely the attorney's conflict of interest, as there was no allegation that.
he misused privileged information. Id. at 927. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 130-39 (strongly
criticizing the expansive application of mail fraud statute in Bronston).
132 See Coffee, supra note 16, at 126-30 (intangible rights doctrine has overcriminalized torts);
Hurson, supra note 12, at 456-60 (suggesting revision of statute to specify scheme to defraud);
Ralph E. Loomis, Comment, Federal Prosecution o f Elected Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prose-
cution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U. L. Rev. 63, 66 (1978) (through broad construction
of mail fraud statute, "courts have tailed to consider when and where such federal intervention
is appropriate").
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unanimously accepted it as a proper application of the mail fraud
statute.'"
Nevertheless, in McNally v. United States,' 34 the Supreme Court
placed the first real constraint on federal prosecutorial power under
the mail fraud statute by rejecting the intangible rights theory. The
Court announced that the "scheme to defraud" element simply does
not include intangible non-property rights: 'The mail fraud statute
clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible
right of the citizenry to good government."'" The Court noted that
the 1909 statute incorporated Durland v. United States, which held that
the statute reached only those attempts to defraud that involved money
or property.' 36
Although the statutory language encompasses "any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property" by false state-
ments, the Court read the "common understanding" of the statute as
interpreted in Durland to apply the property requirement to both
fraudulent schemes and false statements to obtain money or prop-
erty.'" In rejecting the broad interpretation adopted by the lower
courts to apply the intangible rights theory, the Supreme Court stated,
"If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it
has."'"
McNally brought the intangible rights theory to a sudden and
unexpected, albeit short-lived, halt.' 39 One immediate effect of the
decision was to permit defendants to challenge convictions based on
133 McNally v. United States, 483 U,S. 550, 365 (1987) (Stevens, )., dissenting) (every court
that has considered intangible rights theory has upheld its application).
134 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
135 /d. at 356. The defendants were charged with mail fraud in connection with a kickback
scheme involving insurance commissions related to a state workers compensation policy. One of
the defendants was a Kentucky state official who agreed to continue the policy with the agency
paying the kickbacks. Id. at 353. The defendants were charged with depriving the citizens of
Kentucky of their right to have the State's affairs conducted honestly. Id. at 359.
"6 /c/. at 357-60 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1896)).,
137 Id. at 358-59 ("The codification of the holding in Durland in 1909 does not indicate that
Congress was departing from this common understanding.").
'se Id. at 360. The Court's statement echoes its statement in Maze, where it noted with regard
to the scope of the mailing requirement, "Congress could have drafted the mail fraud statute so
as to require only that the mails be in fact used as a result of the fraudulent scheme. But it did
not do this ...." United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1979).
Justice Stevens dissented in McNally, attacking the "crabbed construction" of the statute and
noting that "the most distressing aspect of the Court's action today is its casual—almost sum-
mary—rejection of the accumulated wisdom of the many distinguished federal judges who have
thoughtfully considered and correctly answered the question these cases present." 483 U.S. at
374, 376.
139 See Podgor, supra note 66, at 233 (intangible rights theory "came to a screeching halt").
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schemes that involved only non-property rights.'" The most notable
case involved former Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel, in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
defendant was entitled to have his conviction vacated under McNally
because otherwise "petitioners, who contested their guilt at each stage
of the proceeding, would face the remainder of their lives branded as
criminals simply because their federal trial occurred before rather than
after the Supreme Court's ruling in McNally. "141
2. McNally Rejected: The Right of Honest Services as a Basis for
Mail Fraud Prosecutions
Congress reacted swiftly to McNally by taking up the Court's chal-
lenge to amend the statute if it wished to reach fraudulent deprivations
of non-property rights. As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 142
Congress added to Title 18 a new section 1346 which states in its
entirety, "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice
to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services."'" As with other amendments to
the mail fraud statute, the legislative history of this provision is sparse,
although one sponsor stated that Congress intended to restore the law
to its pre-McNally state. 144
140 The two means to vacate a federal conviction are a writ of error coram nobis fur defendants
who had already served their sentences, see United States v, Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506-11 & n.6
(1954) (federal courts have authority under All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988), to grant
writ of error coram nobis to vacate conviction), or a writ of habeas (lupus, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988),
for defendants in custody.
141 United States v. Mandel, B62 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906
(1989); see also United States v. Walgren, 885 F,2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting writ of error
COMM nobis reversing conviction of former state legislator convicted under intangible rights
theory).
The Supreme Court blunted some of the effect of its restrictive reading of Ilse fraud element
by upholding mail and wire fraud convictions in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987),
on the grounds that the principal defendant had breached a fiduciary duty by depriving his
employer of non-tangible property rights. Id. at 25. R. Foster Winans, a reporter for the Wall
Stmet journal, leaked information, to friends about upcoming stories that would affect the price
of the stock of companies mentioned in the articles. Id. at 23. The Court held that Winans
breached a fiduciary duty to his employer by using the information for personal gain, thereby
defrauding the Wall Street Journal of its intangible property right in the information. Id. at 28.
' 42 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508.
143 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). See Donna M. Maus, Comment, License Procurement and the
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 58 U. Cut. L. REv. 1125, 1129 (1991) (reviewing bills introduced in
Congress to overturn McNally).
144 See 134 CONG. REC. 1-1 1 1,251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers); Podgor,
supra note 66, at 236 (drafters intended to reverse McNally).
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The legislation does not define what the "right of honest services"
encompasses. To the extent that the intangible rights theory permits
the government to define the scope of the statute by identifying new
or broader constituencies with a claim to "honest services," the mail
fraud statute will continue to expand in scope.' 45 More importantly,
congressional enactment of section 1346 signals a new method by
which the Federal Government will police arguably illegal conduct.
Rather than use the mail fraud statute as the "first line of defense"
described by Chiefjustice Burger in Maze, 146 Congress relies on a broad
provision to attack problems without writing more explicit legislation
that clearly describes the scope of the perceived harm and the nature
of the acts that will subject a person or entity to federal criminal
prosecution.' 47
If Congress feared that political corruption, the underlying wrong
in McNally, would not be prosecuted, it could have adopted an anti-
corruption or kickback statute that would apply to state and local
officials. The bribery and conflict of interest statute for federal officials 148
or the employee benefit plan kickback statute 148 could have provided
Congress with models. The problem with the specific anti-corruption
statutes is that they require proof of elements not found in the mail
fraud statute, such as acceptance of the compensation in relation to
the person's duties' 5° or an intent to be influenced. 15 '
The appeal of the mail fraud statute is that the prosecution must
only prove a scheme to defraud that involves some degree of dishon-
esty and a use of the mails related to the scheme, but not specific intent
to receive or demand an item of value. Moreover, the mail fraud statute
casts a wider net because it reaches any participant in a scheme involv-
ing breaches of both public and private fiduciary duties. The right of
145 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch
Over Us, 31 FlAxv. J. LEGIS. 153, 171 (1994) ('"The statutory right to honest services, intended by
Congress to mean a right to good government, is an undefined, amorphous right with uncertain
boundaries.").
145 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, CI, dissenting).
147 See Moolir, supra note 145, at 188 (arguing that § 1346 is unconstitutional due to vague-
ness in failure to define "honest services"); Podgor, supra note (16, at 239 (Congress should define
the specific conduct that constitutes dishonesty).
1411 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (bribery), 203 & 205 (conflict of interest), 207 (post-employment
lobbying and representation), 208 (participation in activities with a financial interest), 209
(accepting outside salary) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
149 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1988).
1511 See., e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1988 & Stipp. 1993) ("Whoever, otherwise than as provided
by law for the proper discharge of official duties . . .').
151 See 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1988) ("because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to,
any of his actions, decisions, or other duties").
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honest services does not require specific proof of the relationship of
the acts to the defendant's duties, i.e., a quid pro quo, but only that
the activity was dishonest. Rather than write specific legislation address-
ing particular forms of corruption or dishonesty, Congress relied on a
very broad statute to reach conduct that is arguably criminal because
that route was more expedient both for itself and for the prosecutors
who will enforce the law.
Expanding the mail fraud statute also allows Congress to avoid
confronting the issue of federalism, implicated through congressional
extension of the power of the Federal Government into an area that
is traditionally reserved for the states.'" The very breadth of the intan-
gible rights theory permits Congress to throw to the executive branch
the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, the Federal Gov-
ernment's power should be used to prosecute what are essentially local
crimes)" By not defining the scope of the statute, Congress can hide
behind a general legislative grant of authority to prosecutors to "call
them as they see them." More specific legislation would, of course, raise
the question of whether Congress should federalize crimes tradition-
ally handled at the state and local level, and whether that is the best
use of scarce federal resources) 54
McNally was the first real limitation imposed by the Supreme
Court on the mail fraud statute, and Congress overturned that deci-
152 There is no question that the Federal Government has the power to enact criminal laws
that can extend to virtually any crime, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution notwithstand-
ing. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 196 (1971); William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law:
Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 Am. Cam. L. REV. 1790,
1748 (1989) (no constitutional limits on Congress's power to regulate acts through criminal laws).
In United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106 (6th Ci t. 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court ruling that the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119
(1988), was unconstitutional on the ground that there was not a sufficient nexus between the
criminal act and interstate commerce. The circuit court noted that "lilt may well he that the
carjacking statute is unwise and encroaches on traditional views of federalism ... but it is not
unconstitutional under current Commerce Clause doctrine." Johnson, 22 F.3d at 109. Professor
Van Alstyne distinguishes between constitutional federalism, which incorporates legal limits on
Congress's power, and political federalism, under which "it is for Congress to decide to what
extent it desires to make national law, whether civil or criminal, and that is that." Van Alstyne,
supra, at 1740. It is the latter form of federalism to which this Article refers.
153 See Moolm supra note 145, at 177 ("When combined with the intangible rights doctrine,
broad prosecutorial discretion means that prosecutors decide whom to charge, and more sig-
nificantly fin . our purposes, what behavior is defined as criminal.").
154 See Coffee, supra note 23, at 21 (use of federal prosecutors for lower level business crimes
through mail fraud statute is "a gross misallocation of resources and an abdication of responsi-
bility"); Roger]. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 14A ay. j.L. & Pun. PoC Y
117, 126 (1987) ("Federal prosecution should be limited to misconduct affecting clearly defined
national interests.").
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sion, permitting continued expansion of the statute, rather than de-
ciding what acts should be illegal. What started as a limitation on the
mail fraud statute served as the catalyst for Congress to expand the
provision through direct legislation. Section 1346 signals the congres-
sional transformation of the mail fraud statute from a provision de-
signed to protect the postal service, and secondarily as a stopgap
measure for prosecutors until the legislature can draft more specific
legislation, to the primary engine of federal prosecution. Where the
statute had once been a prototype for more specific provisions, such
as the bank fraud statute, it is now a means in and of itself for expand-
ing federal prosecutions.
B. The Interstate Carrier Expansion of the Mail Fraud Statute
L The Initial Effort to Expand Federal Jurisdiction
When Congress enacted the first mail fraud statute, the post office
provided the primary means to transport a small item, such as a letter,
printed material, or merchandise, to another locality. 155 The post office
was among the largest departments in the Federal Government in the
post-Civil War era, and probably was the primary direct contact most
individuals had with federal authorities.' 56
 The past twenty years have
seen the creation and growth of private delivery companies akin to the
postal service that can deliver a package to any address throughout the
United States, and even most parts of the world. The mail fraud statute,
however, remained tied to the use of the postal service as the predicate
for federal jurisdiction over an offense.'"
The first effort to expand the mailing element came in the after-
math of McNally. Senator Joseph Biden, the chair of the Senate Judiciary
155 See MARSHALL CUSHING, THE STORY OF OUR POST OFFICE 24 (A.M. Thayer & CO. 1893)
(inland mail service in 1892 contained approximately 30,000 mail routes).
156 See id. at 11 (post office employees, totaling 229,435 in 1892, were "the bulk of the army
of public servants in this country").
157 See United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 895 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing mail fraud
conviction for Government's failure to introduce evidence concerning mailing practices of insurance
company when disbursing checks); United States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 705, 797 . (3d Cir. 1989)
(reversing mail fraud conviction for Failure to prove use of 'nails where secretary and repre-
sentative testified that mails were used "99%" of the time, but sometimes private delivery service
used, and there was no testimony about the particular mailing to defendant); While Collar Crime
Survey, supra note 18, at 718-19 ("use of the mails will not be established where evidence exists
that shows both public mailings and private mailing services (e.g., Federal Express) were used in
the office"); cf. Utz v. Correa, 63l F. Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (delivery of draft letter by
messenger and intrastate telephone calls insufficient for violation of mail and wire fraud statutes
as predicates for civil RICO claim).
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Committee, introduced the Anti-Corruption Act of 1989 ("Anti-Cor-
ruption Act"),I 58 a comprehensive statute to prosecute public corruption
cases that had been brought under the intangible rights theory prior
to the Supreme Court's rejection of that approach. 159 The proposed
statute was an example of congressional consideration of a specific
provision that would supplant the mail fraud statute for a particular
type of criminal activity. In addition, though, one provision of the bill
would have amended the wire fraud statute to permit prosecutions of
any fraudulent scheme executed through the use of "any facility of
interstate or foreign commerce."'"°The proposal would have extended
federal jurisdiction beyond use of the mails or an interstate wire "to
include corrupt schemes which involve the use of . . . a Federal high-
way, or affect interstate or foreign commerce."" The rationale _Rmr
expanding the statute by making it coextensive with Congress's power
to regulate interstate commerce was to reach cases that involve "new
technologies or commercial express mail carriers used to facilitate a
corrupt scheme. "162
The proposed Anti-Corruption Act would have altered the struc-
ture of the federal fraud statutes by making jurisdiction under the wire
fraud statute dependent solely on the use of the means of interstate
commerce, a broad basis that would permit federal prosecutors to
reach virtually any transaction.'" The requirement to prove the "pur-
pose" of the wire for executing the scheme would have been eliminated
from the wire fraud statute, and the only substantive element that the
Government would have had to prove would be that the defendant
engaged in a scheme to defraud with the requisite intent.
If enacted, this provision would have made the mail fraud statute
superfluous because the Federal Government could prosecute any
fraud that had an effect on interstate commerce, regardless of whether
it involved a mailing. Coupled with the enactment of section 1346's
reinstatement of the intangible rights doctrine, the Federal Govern-
ment's power to prosecute any act of alleged dishonesty would have
been unchecked. Congress did not pass the Anti-Corruption Act, but
in the Department of justice appropriations bill for fiscal year 1990, it
directed the Department to provide recommended statutory language
1 " S. 527, 101st Cong., 1st Sess, reprinted in 135 CoNG. REC. 51064 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1989).
159 See 135 CONG. REC. S1063 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bitten).
1 r*S. 327, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, reprinted in 135 CoNG. RE.:. 51064 (daily ed. Feb. 2,
1989). The legislation would have deleted the interstate wire clement.
161 135 CoNG. REC. S1096-67 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thurmond),
162 /d. at S1067.
163 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S, 146 (1971).
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for "[e]xpanding the Federal mail fraud statute to include commercial
mail couriers and facsimile machines." 164
2. Genesis of the Interstate Carrier Amendment
Two years later, Congress again returned to the mail fraud statute,
in the proposed Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991. 165
 The proposed
legislation contained an amendment expanding the mailing element
to include both the use of the postal service or "any private or com-
mercial interstate carrier."' 66 Although Congress did not pass the crime
bill during that session, the provision signaled Congress's determina-
tion to expand the mail fraud statute to address the use of means other
than the postal service to engage in fraudulent schemes. Proposed
amendments to the mail fraud statute surfaced again in the next
legislative session, when the Senate passed the Senior Citizens Against
Marketing Scams Act ("SCAMS") of 1993 to address fraudulent tele-
marketing schemes that target the elderly. This bill incorporated the
identical provision from the 1991 crime bill to expand the scope of the
mail fraud statute.' 67 The House of Representatives incorporated SCAMS
into the broader Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, which Congress passed on September 13, 1994.' 6g
Congressional hearings on SCAMS identified schemes in which
sellers of nonexistent or overpriced goods used private delivery serv-
164 H. REP. No. 909, 101st Cong, 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. H 10,877 (daily
ed. Oct. 20, 1990). A second direction was for language to amend the wire fraud statute "to
prohibit illegal activities which affect interstate commerce," id., which is essentially the same
approach as the changes proposed in the Anti-Corruption Act of 1989.
165 41.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
166 /d. § 1301. The amendment states:
Sec. 1301. MAIL FRAUD
Section 1341 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by inserting "or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier,"
alter "Postal Service,"; and
(2) by inserting "or such carrier" after "causes to be delivered by mail".
The mail fraud amendment was also added to other legislation as part of an effort to attach
some of the less controversial elements of the crime bill, which was stalled by filibuster in the
Senate, to legislation with a better chance of enactment. See 138 CoNG. REG. S6115 (daily ed. May
6, 1992) (amendment to Telephone Privacy Act); 138 CONG. REC. S6745 (daily ed. May 14, 1992)
(National Voter Registration Act); 138 CONG. REC. 58003 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (Workplace
Fairness Act); 138 CoNG. REC. SI6,360 (daily ed. October 2, 1992) (Public Health Service Act
Amendments of 1992); 138 CONG. Ric. 516,526 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (Health Care Fraud
Prosecution Act of 1992).
167 S. 557, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1993). The bill passed the Senate by a voice vote on July
30, 1993. 139 CoNG. REG. 510,015, 510,017 (daily ed. July 30, 1993),
1 " Pub. L. No. 103-332, §§ 250001-250008, 108 Stat. 1796, 2081-88.
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ices to send the items, and directed purchasers to remit their payments
by private carriers rather than the postal service, to avoid falling under
the mail fraud statute. 1 " The expansion of the mail fraud statute is part
of an effort to combat con artists who prey on individuals through
sophisticated programs involving high pressure sales tactics, but the
amendment is not limited to such schemes. Instead, Congress has
augmented an already powerful provision by expanding federal juris-
diction over any fraudulent scheme, not just telemarketing frauds, that
use the postal service or any private or commercial interstate carrier.
3. The Expanding Scope of Federal Jurisdiction
The question remains how the courts should interpret the expan-
sion of the mail fraud statue. The phrase "private or commercial
interstate carrier" could mean that the item must be transported inter-
state, and not just intrastate, before it falls under the mail fraud statute.
A second interpretation would look to the nature of the carrier, and
not what in fact happened in the transportation of the item, to deter-
mine jurisdiction. Under a third approach, the reference to "inter-
state" carriers would mean that Congress has extended the mail fraud
statute to any fraudulent scheme that affects interstate commerce. The
second interpretation is the best analysis of the scope of the statute,
based on the development of the provision and its relation to other
federal statutes that take differing approaches to the interstate com-
merce element of the offense.
In Perez v. United States,' 7° the Supreme Court stated that the
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to reach three categories
of activity: first, the use of the channels of interstate commerce; second,
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and, third,
activities affecting interstate commerce."' Courts require proof of one
16'9 See Mail Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Services of the House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 246-300 (Oct. 6, 1993) (statement
of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Association,
and Statement of Thomas G.,aiazza, Managing Director, Customer Service, Eastern Region, Federal
Express Corp.); International Consumer Fraud: Can Consumers be Protected: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. an Regulation and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-22,50-59 (Oct. 15, 1993) (testimony of John F. Barker, Director, National
Fraud Information Center) (telemarketing boiler rooms avoid federal jurisdiction "by being
careful—they used private mail carriers instead of the U.S. mail," id. at 52).
17°402 U.S. 140 (1971).
171 Id. at 150. The defendant challenged his conviction for loan sharking under the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1988), arguing that his activities involved
only intrastate commerce, and therefore were beyond the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate. Perez, 402 U.S. at 146-49.
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of these three varying levels of involvement in interstate commerce,
depending on the wording in different statutes, as the prerequisite for
federal jurisdiction. 172
An example of the first category of the required relationship to
interstate commerce for federal prosecution is the National Stolen
Property Act, 17" which reaches any person who "transports, transmits,
or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, mer-
chandise, securities or money . . . knowing the same to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud." The statute requires the Gov-
ernment to plead and prove that the stolen article was actually trans-
ported to another state or outside the country,'" but it need not prove
that the transportation of the items was an essential part of the fraud. 176
Similarly, the wire fraud statute, which is a companion to the mail fraud
statute, requires proof that the wire communication was interstate and
not just intrastate, in addition to being for the purpose of executing
the scheme.'" Examples of other statutes that require proof of trans-
172 s„, g McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1980) ("The conceptual
distinction between activities 'in' interstate commerce and those which 'affect' interstate com-
merce has been preserved in the cases, for Congress has seen fit to preserve that distinction in
the antitrust and related laws by limiting the applicability of certain provisions to activities
demonstrably `in commerce.'"). Where Congress has not expressly required proof of some nexus
between the charged act and interstate commerce in the statute, the Government must allege
the necessary nexus in its indictment. Russell V. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-66 (1962);
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1960). Although Congress is not required to make
explicit findings about the relationship of the proscribed activity and the Commerce Clause,
statutes that intrude upon the power and prerogatives of the states should include clear expres-
sions of congressional intent to use the commerce power to usurp state authority. See Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. I, 7 (1989) (plurality opinion) (abrogation of state sovereign immunity
by federal statute permitted only if intent is "unmistakably clear"). In United States v. Lopez, 2
F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(1988), was unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, when
there were 110 congressional findings or legislative history to support the usurpation of authority
traditionally reserved to the states.
17'1 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (Supp. 1993).
174 Id. (emphasis added).
17.5
	
United States v. Brum], 809 F.2d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing conviction where
there was no proof that defendant transported or caused another to transport stolen securities
into the state); United States v. Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1949) (Government must
show that defendant knew goods were stolen and that they were in fact transported in interstate
commerce), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 815 (1949).
176 United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 385 (1946).
111 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988 & Supp. 1993), provides:
Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to defraud	 . transmits or
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined ... or imprisoned
... or both.
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portation in interstate commerce are section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 178 and the Mann Act.'"
The second category of statutes are those that premise federal
jurisdiction on the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce,
but do not require separate proof of interstate transportation in con-
nection with the criminal act. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act, a broad anti-fraud provision, prohibits acts "by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails . . ." 1 " A
similar approach is taken in the statute governing destruction of air-
craft and motor vehicles, which cover any civil aircraft or motor vehicle
"used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign com-
merce."18 ' These statutes are similar to the mail fraud statute before its
most recent amendment, in that Congress is using the status of the
facility used in the crime as the basis for federal jurisdiction rather than
requiring proof that the item actually moved in interstate commerce.
The third category of statutes implicates Congress's broadest ap-
plication of its power under the Commerce Clause by reaching any
activity that affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court defined
the scope of Congressional power in Wichard v. Filburn, 182 which stated,
"even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."'"
The focus on the class of activities, and not the individual instances
that may be prosecuted under the statute, determines whether Con-
gress has the power to regulate the acts covered by the statute.'"
See, e.g., United States v. Davila, 592 F.2d 1261, 1.263-64 (5th Cir. 1979) (wire communications
within one state sufficient if routed through another state).
178
'fhe Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(l) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement ... .
1 " The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. 2421 (1988), provides: "Whoever knowingly transports any
individual in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that such individual engage in
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,
shall be lined . or imprisoned ... or both."
18° 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1988). The act defines "Interstate Commerce" to include "intrastate use
of (A) any facility of a national securities exchange or of a telephone or other interstate means
of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17) (1988).
181 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a) (1), 33 (1988).
182 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
185 /d. at 125.
184 See. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Where the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise,
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RICO"' and the Hobbs Ace" are both premised on acts that affect
interstate commerce without requiring proof that the article used for
federal jurisdiction actually moved in interstate commerce.' 87 With
regard to the Hobbs Act, the Supreme Court stated that the statutory
language shows the purpose "to use all the constitutional power Con-
gress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion,
robbery or physical violence."'"
The Violent Crime Act amendment to the mail fraud statute is
similar to the second category of statutes, requiring proof that an
instrumentality of interstate commerce is used for the purpose of
executing the fraudulent scheme. The provision is comparable to
section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which reaches any
instrumentality of interstate commerce, while the expanded mail fraud
statute reaches a specified instrument of interstate commerce in addi-
tion to the mails.'" The Violent Crime Act avoids using the language
of the wire fraud statute, the companion to the mail fraud statute, and
other more restrictive provisions requiring proof that the article be
"in" interstate commerce.
It is doubtful that Congress would have imposed a requirement
that the Government prove that the item shipped by an interstate
carrier actually travelled between two states. That interpretation would
narrow the scope of an amendment meant to reach fraudulent schemes
previously beyond federal jurisdiction. The "private or commercial
interstate carriers" are identical to the postal service as a mode of
as trivial, individual instances' of the class.") (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193
(1968)).
185 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1965 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
186 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1961 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
187 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988) (RICO provision prohibiting acquiring or maintaining
control of an enterprise "which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce"); 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988) (Hobbs Act provision prohibiting violence or threat
thereof that "obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity
in commerce"); United States v, Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 1994) (Government failed
to establish that RICO enterprise "had anything more than an incidental effect on interstate
commerce"), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 354 (1994); United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032, 1035
(9th Cir. 1991) (sufficient effect on interstate commerce where blackmail scheme would have an
impact on target's employer, which engaged in interstate commerce),
188 Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). Even the broadest application of
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce does not mean that any item necessarily
affects interstate commerce to permit federal jurisdiction. In United States v. Levine, 41 F.3d 607,
613-14 (10th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that under
18 U.S.C. § 1365, which prohibits tampering with consumer products which affect interstate
commerce, requires the Government to prove that the tampering had the requisite effect on
interstate commerce, not merely that the product had such an effect before the criminal activity.
189 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C, § 78j (1988).
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transportation by which a scheme is executed, and therefore the fact
of passage in interstate commerce is irrelevant to the acts Congress is
reaching in the statute. Interpreting the amendment to require proof
of interstate movement violates the tenor of the statute by importing
an interstate transportation requirement that has applied traditionally
for this type of crime only to the wire fraud statute.
The amendment also does not reflect Congress using the extent
of its power under the Commerce Clause to reach any activity that may
affect interstate commerce. The language does not exhibit an attempt
to reach a class of activities, as interpreted in Perez, that may have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.'" The Violent Crime Act
amendment takes a more restrictive approach than the Anti-Corrup-
tion Act proposal, which invoked Congress's full power under the
Commerce Clause by covering any facility of interstate commerce and
not just interstate carriers. Moreover, carriers have the requisite effect
on interstate commerce, and therefore Congress could have used the
broadest jurisdictional means to reach virtually any shipment by any
carrier engaged in commerce. The language chosen by Congress,
however, shows that "interstate" modifies "carrier," and should not be
interpreted as a statement by Congress that the mail fraud statute
reaches any activity that may have an impact on commerce.
4. What is an "Interstate Carrier"
Although the amendment is best understood as requiring an in-
strumentality of interstate commerce, the question remains how courts
should interpret the scope of "interstate carrier." Prosecutors can now
bring cases based on either use of the mails or shipment by an inter-
state carrier, but neither the statute nor the legislative history define
the latter term. The large delivery service companies, such as Federal
Express and United Parcel Service, are clearly interstate carriers, but
small entities, such as local messenger services, are not as easily cate-
gorized. The local carrier may provide delivery services in-town while
also delivering packages to an interstate carrier, or it may be able to
identify only isolated instances in which it transported a package to
another state. That company may be very similar to one that operates
tgoir the class of activities analysis applies to the amendment, it follows that the entire
fraudulent scheme, and nut just the use of the 'nails or the post office, may be reviewed to
determine whether there is it substantial effect On interstate commerce. Such an approach may
limit the statute; for example, sonic political corruption schemes, such as absentee voter frauds,
might nut be covered under the statute because they have, at best, only a minimal impact on
interstate commerce.
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in a metropolitan area, such as New York City or Washington, D.C.,
where it will cross state lines with some regularity but is not otherwise
an interstate carrier.
If courts take a broad commerce clause approach, they could
construe the term "interstate" as similar to the "affecting commerce"
approach to federal jurisdiction, that a carrier with any substantial
effect on interstate commerce satisfies the statutory requirement.m
That analysis avoids any review of the movement of the item at issue
or the actual extent of interstate shipments by the carrier. Instead, the
designation of interstate carrier would depend on the size of the
operation, whether it is significant enough to have an impact on
interstate commerce, regardless of whether the company ever deliv-
ered an item between the states.
The weakness in this analysis is that it divorces the jurisdictional
means, i.e., the use of an interstate carrier, from proof that the use of
that carrier was for the purpose of executing the scheme. Even after
the Violent Crime Act amendment, the Government must still prove
that the use of an interstate carrier was for the purpose of executing
the scheme. It would be anomalous to interpret the character of the
means of transportation as broadly as permissible for jurisdictional
reasons without reference to the underlying act charged in the indict-
ment, when that act must also be shown to be for the purpose of
executing the scheme. Congress is protecting against misuse of the
postal service and interstate carriers, not just any local bike-messenger
service that may be used to pick-up or deliver an item. Moreover, if
courts adopt an "affecting commerce" analysis to define whether an
entity constitutes an interstate carrier, then that merely incorporates
the broadest Commerce Clause interpretation into the statute to per-
mit the use of virtually any delivery service to support a federal prose-
cution.
The better interpretation of the interstate carrier amendment is
that the Government must prove that the business of the company
used for the purpose of executing the scheme involves significant
interstate shipments, and not just that the general business has an
effect on interstate commerce. This approach comports with the lan-
guage Congress adopted, which does not support the broadest possible
application of federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.
The focus should be on the nature of the business involving
significant interstate shipments to permit a finding that the defendant
191 See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279-80 (1975)
(Commerce Clause power extends to "all activity substantia1ly affecting interstate commerce").
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caused an item to be transported by an interstate carrier in execution
of a fraudulent scheme. If a company is primarily local, and any
interstate shipment is only incidental to its business, then the mail
fraud statute should not apply. On the other hand, if the defendant
uses a national carrier with an economically significant share of its
business involving interstate transportation of items, then the happen-
stance of local delivery without crossing state lines should not defeat
jurisdiction.
The fact that a particular delivery did not cross state lines should
not defeat federal jurisdiction because, as discussed above, the statute
does not require proof that the item was "in" interstate commerce.
Defeating federal jurisdiction solely because the interstate carrier did
not move the item across state lines would read into the provision a
requirement that Congress in this area has only expressly imposed
under the wire fraud statute, the companion to the mail fraud statute.
Under the latest version of the statute, for schemes that use the
postal service, the Government need only introduce evidence of the
use of the mails. The interstate carrier provision requires the Govern-
ment to prove the nature of the carrier's business, to permit the jury
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the company is an
interstate carrier and not merely a local delivery service. Under either
jurisdictional prong of the amended statute, the Government must
further prove the substantive element that the interstate carrier or the
mails were used for the purpose of executing the scheme.
The expansion of the statute will complicate the prosecution's
case by requiring the Government to introduce competent evidence
of the business of the carrier to permit the jury to find that the
company has the requisite interstate character. The net effect, however,
will be to expand the number of prosecutions that may be brought and
could ultimately simplify the Government's proof of the transportation
element. The bulk of the cases that had escaped prosecution because
of conscious avoidance of the postal service probably involved one of
the major delivery services. These companies are invariably interstate
carriers, in that a significant share of their business involves interstate
shipments, and they maintain records of pick-up and delivery, unlike
the postal service. The proof of the use of the interstate carrier will
involve the introduction of business records and the appearance of a
corporate witness who can testify as to the carrier's interstate nature.
The relevant records should be readily accessible, a benefit some
delivery services have extolled in advertisements.
The use of interstate carriers is not limited to telemarketers who
prey on seniors or other unsophisticated investors. The amendment to
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the mail fraud statute is not targeted at only a narrow category of
articles, and is not tied to use of the telephone or schemes to sell goods
or services at inflated prices. Instead, Congress has used the mail fraud
statute as the primary weapon to attack both telemarketing and any
other fraudulent scheme that uses either the postal service or an
interstate carrier. Congress has broadened the reach of the statute to
cover a gap that had developed with the advent of private delivery
services that have to some degree supplanted the postal service.
IV. CONCLUSION
The amended statute has, in one sense, restored the law to the
position it was in when first enacted over 120 years ago, covering the
most pervasive means of communicating with individuals through the
direct delivery of letters, documents and merchandise. The Supreme
Court's expansive application of the mailing element in Schmuck, how-
ever, shows that the mail fraud statute is no longer a narrowly targeted
statute, as was the provision enacted in 1872 to protect the integrity of
the mails. The difference between the original mail fraud statute and
its current state is that the definition of fraud has been expanded far
beyond any conception of the scope of the statute in the nineteenth
century. Today, the mailing element seemingly provides federal prose-
cutors with carte blanche to prosecute virtually any activity to which
the mail or a shipment by interstate carrier can be linked, no matter
how tangential.
Section 1346, coupled with the interstate carrier amendment,
gives federal prosecutors arguably the broadest statute they can apply
to acts of dishonesty, whether political, economic, or personal. It is
doubtful that many fraudulent schemes, as now defined by the ex-
panded jurisdictional scope of the statute and section 1346, can escape
prosecution because the Government cannot prove federal jurisdiction
or a deprivation of the right of honest services. The only real limitation
is the purpose element, that the use of the mails or an interstate carrier
have a relationship to the execution of the scheme. After Schmuck,
however, the strength of that element as a check on the Government's
power to prosecute is questionable.
The mail fraud statute came into existence almost as an after-
thought, and was long treated as a harmless stepchild by Congress
when it enacted changes, with no evidence of legislative intent as to
the extent to which it sought to expand federal power or the meaning
of its changes. The Supreme Court has treated the statute with very
little respect, refusing to define the meaning of the purpose element
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and repeatedly issuing obtuse, even contradictory opinions that pro-
vide no real guidance about the scope of the mailing provision. The
Court's only attempt to limit the meaning of fraud ignored unanimous
lower court interpretations of the mail fraud statute and brought a swift
rebuke from Congress.
Rather than relying on the provision as a stopgap, Congress now
views the mail fraud statute as the principal measure to prosecute
dishonest and fraudulent activities, without having to bother with draft-
ing more specific criminal statutes to address the issue. The trend
toward federalizing activities traditionally left to state and local authori-
ties continues unabated with the latest addition to the mail fraud
statute. The interstate carrier amendment has severed the provision
from its roots as a means to protect the integrity of the post office.
Section 1341 is no longer just a mail fraud statute, but has moved
beyond that to become the Federal Fraud Statute.
